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Abstract
Most subnational (and mainly island) jurisdictions around the world today are actively conspiring 
in the dogged pursuit of protracted and extended colonial relationships—what is referred to as 
“upside down decolonization”—rather than aspiring to full independence. Various metropolitan 
powers are also discovering that island territories can be excised and rejigged as jurisdictional 
enclaves, able to perform (and get away with) exceptional functions. These can range from 
detention centers to low-tax regimes, from military bases to exclusive processing zones. In spite 
of the lingering rhetoric about the virtues of sovereignty, these “infinite pauses” in decolonization 
call for a more adequate conceptual assimilation within postcolonial theory.
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Preamble: Tokelau
The agenda item was nothing short of a face-saving exercise. On June 23, 2009, the United 
Nations Special Committee on Decolonization once again took up “the question of Tokelau”: a 
non-self-governing island territory in the Pacific, with a total land area of some 12 km2 spread 
over three scattered atolls, and a resident population of below 1,200 (of which less than 800 were 
registered voters), administered by New Zealand. The Committee was hard put to reconcile itself 
to two “independence” referenda in 2006 and 2007, where the adult citizens of Tokelau were 
asked to choose between their current status quo and a level of self-determination that would 
preserve New Zealand’s support but grant Tokelau formal control over its internal affairs. Both 
referenda failed to produce the two-thirds majority required to change the territory’s non-self-
governing status (“Tokelau referendum does not produce two-thirds majority,” 2006; “Tokelau 
to remain NZ’s last colony,” 2007). The Special Committee noted that the Government of New 
Zealand continued to recognize the right of the territory’s people to self-determination but 
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acknowledged the decision of the General Fono (the Tokelauan Parliament) that the consideration 
of any future act of self-determination would be deferred indefinitely. Meanwhile, New Zealand 
and Tokelau would devote renewed efforts to strengthening essential services and infrastructure, 
thereby ensuring an enhanced quality of life for the islanders.1
That a properly conducted, quasi-independence referendum would fail, twice in a row, may 
be hard to stomach, especially by a standing UN body mandated expressly to propel the decolo-
nization process to what continues to be seen as an almost natural, logical, and morally appropriate 
conclusion. Tokelau remains one of 16 non-self-governing territories (of which 14 are islands) 
on an official UN list that are seen as having yet to graduate to full sovereignty.2
But the UN Special Committee may be flogging a dead horse. The majority of Tokelauans 
want to remain part of New Zealand. In the run-up to the referenda, Tokelauans expressed 
concerns that New Zealand was seeking to loosen its ties with Tokelau; they sought assurances 
from the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs that New Zealand would not impose indepen-
dence on the territory. “Life as a New Zealand colony has brought many benefits to the country. 
There is no poverty, no unemployment, and full literacy.”3 Some felt that Tokelau lacked the 
capacity required of a self-governing state. Others simply saw no reason to change: “Only when 
I’m suffering, then I really want to change. I am not suffering” (quoted in Parker, 2006, p. 75).4
A Different Perspective
One of the overall tenets of postcolonial theory and scholarship has been the need to shift the 
perspective of how the world is viewed toward that which is held by non-Western people; or, as 
Robert Young (2003, p. 2) candidly puts it: “turning the world upside down.” In attempting to 
countervail and unhinge the grand historical narratives of the Age of Empire—scripted by the 
colonizing powers and justifying their heroic, modernizing incursions into the primitive realms 
of heathens and savages—the voices and histories of the people “on the ground” have been 
discovered, acknowledged, and celebrated, and various forms of oppression have been exposed. 
This postcolonial “re-narrativization” displaces a Western “story” of peaceful evolution, self-
righteous supremacy, and capitalist modernity to those anchored in the “imposed violence” of 
dispersed global peripheries (Hall, 1996, p. 250).
And yet, an uncritical reference to imposed violence may be just as mythical and totalizing as 
the imperial narrative it has sought to replace. There remains much to be said and understood 
about smallish remnants of empire where populations (and not just elites) cling stubbornly to 
nonsovereignty, and where metropolitan–territorial relations may have evolved in fairly sophis-
ticated ways to exploit the opportunities of contemporary rampant globalization. In such 
places, it has long been evident that colonialism has largely not been “socially or economically 
problematic” as it had been elsewhere (Connell, 2008, p. 158; also Winchester, 2003). The 
“passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples”—recognized by the United Nations, 
in the heyday of decolonization, and implied by Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 19605—is, 
in most cases, just not there.
To be sure, an anticolonial streak in postcolonialism provides continuity to the ideas and 
literatures that emerged during the anticolonial struggles across the formerly colonized world 
(e.g., Young, 2001)—the ethnic cleansing of the indigenous American and Caribbean societies; 
the evolution and management of the institution of slavery; the migration and consequent diaspora 
formation of displaced natives (including convicts); the effects of race, culture, class, and gender 
in postcolonial settings; histories of resistance and struggle against colonial and neocolonial 
domination; and the complexity of identity formation (e.g., Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 1995). 
Although it is probably a necessary antidote to the enduring propaganda of corporate media and 
the West’s effective use of “guns, germs and steel” (Diamond, 1997), this strand of postcolonial 
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narrative has met strong criticism: Its suggestion that colonialism, characterized by country-to-
country occupation, is now ”post” and therefore “over,” is seen as fundamentally flawed and 
fails to engage with both persisting forms of military subordination as well as other, more subtle, 
forms of neocolonial supremacy. Moreover, in celebrating subaltern processes, postcolonialism 
may have merely replaced one set of heroes with another: dramatizing the revolting slave or 
the leader of the independence struggle, without diagnosing the material context in which these 
events have taken place and without going on to examine the (possibly corrupt, strangely neo-
colonial, or just ambiguous) behavior of native leaders, often turned politicians, after their freedom 
is secured.
There is, meanwhile, another meaning of the “post” in postcolonialism that needs to be 
acknowledged. This suggests the use of poststructuralist and postmodern forms of sociohistori-
cal analysis. The questioning, and debunking, of the imperial grand narrative persist. Novel 
forms of intellectual inquiry (such as discourse analysis) are eschewed, and the uncritical adop-
tion of categories such as ethnicity, class, gender, and identity are summarily contested. The 
perspective is also respectful of multiplicity and plurality while suspicious of how totalizing 
discourses tend to serve as agents of social control (e.g., Best & Kellner, 1991). However, as 
they go about their tasks of deconstruction, these “post” approaches could, given their relativism, 
playfulness, and undecidability, also disengage with the material (cultural, economic, and political) 
conditions within which colonial discourses are nested. They have also been rendered in a language 
of critique inaccessible to all but a few intellectuals who tend to be westernized anyway (e.g., 
Parry, 2004). So the dominance of Western paradigms of interpretation easily ends up being 
reinforced, rather than challenged, by the postmodern orientation (no pun intended).
This article proposes a third, different interpretation of “post” in postcolonialism—one 
driven by the suggestion that the active and dogged pursuit of extended colonial relationships 
and “upside down decolonization” is yet to be duly accounted for conceptually by postcolonial 
theory.
Another Way of  Turning the World “Upside Down”
The meaning of “upside down decolonization” in the context of this article is markedly different 
from what Robert Young intended. The phrase was coined by Dutch scholars in the process of 
observing the situation in the (formerly) Netherlands Antilles,6 whereby it was the metropolis, and 
not the former colonies, which was pressing the latter for independence (Hoefte & Oostindie, 
1989, 1991). The persisting seven colonial powers—Australia, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—find themselves in an “enforced 
colonial condition” while their wards “opt [italics added] for dependency status” (Skinner, 2006, 
p. 185). This is described rather glibly as “an unusual situation” (Allahar, 2005, p. 132) whereby 
the mother country seemed willing, even anxious, to free itself from the responsibilities of Empire7 
but the colonies in question would demur and not let the mother country off the hook (Oostindie & 
Klinkers, 2003). Earlier, a similar situation in the neighboring French Département d’Outre Mer 
of Martinique had been described as a “paradox in paradise” (Miles, 1985).
It would, however, be fairer to state that the above situation is neither unusual nor paradoxical. 
The politics of “upside down decolonization” are the norm rather than the exception in today’s 
non-independent (and mainly island) territories.
First of all, with some exceptions, sovereignty does not appear to be any longer the obvious 
trajectory of peoples who see themselves as dispossessed political entities or at the losing end of 
federalist developments (e.g., Baldacchino & Milne, 2006; Trompf, 1993). In the contemporary 
world, there may be solid definitive advantages in not being independent. They may all have 
their quirks and tendencies—for patronage in particular—yet most of today’s populated 
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subnational island jurisdictions are functioning democracies and have been so for decades. This 
suggests that their political economy is working and that the majority of the population must be 
benefiting sufficiently from current arrangements so as not to opt for radical change. Their territo-
rial elites are generally aware of a few specific but significant economic benefits associated with 
their jurisdiction’s political affiliation. These include the “free riding” afforded to them from the 
protection of the flag (in areas such as international security, currency, and law and order); the 
metropolitan oversight that bestows regulatory legitimacy (particularly to offshore finance, 
which in turn makes their banking and gaming sectors especially attractive to foreign investors 
and sales corporations); the seamless connectivity with the labor market of a larger, richer country 
(which allows the metropole’s tourists to visit and support the domestic economy while ensuring 
freedom of movement for the islanders for employment, residence, or education in the metro-
pole, even if as a backup option); and the potential bailout in case of persistent budgetary 
shortfalls, maladministration, natural disasters, and other (including military) threats.
Second, the case for nonsovereignty may have strong supporters in the metropole, and their 
arguments represent an ingenious reterritorialization of colonial spaces. A strategic (re)engi-
neering of jurisdiction allows the state to carve out and earmark specific and clearly delineated 
territory for special, and specialized, services. These include detention camps, quarantine sites, 
offshore finance centers, low-/no-tax havens, enterprise processing zones, geostrategic military 
bases, remote weapons testing ranges, toxic waste dump sites, duty-free zones, heritage and 
conservation parks, spaces without right of abode, and various “mix and match” combinations 
of the above. In the present imperial moment, we ought to expect more Guantánamo Bays, not 
fewer (Butler, 2004). The decisions to earmark such spaces in this exceptional manner would 
not be possible, feasible, or prudent if extended over a state’s total territory and population 
(Reid-Henry, 2007).
And yet, the value-laden discourse of mainstream political science along with the scrutiny of 
the United Nations Committee on Decolonization belie an enduring obsession with the mantra of 
sovereignty as an intrinsically laudable, and almost historically unavoidable, evolutionary route. 
It may be timely to seriously consider a postcolonial theorization that better accommodates such 
contemporary practices in the spatial transformation of metropolitan–colonial relations, which—
pardon the mixed metaphor—take the concept of “upside down” to new heights.
Enduring Colonialism
The experience of Tokelau is not unique. During the last four decades, referenda in Niue (1974 and 
1999), the Cook Islands (1974), Mayotte (1976), the Dutch Antilles (1993 and 1994), Puerto Rico 
(1967, 1993, and 1998), U.S. Virgin Islands (1993), Bermuda (1995), Dutch Sint Maarten (2000), 
Bonaire (2004), Saba (2004), Curaçao (2005), and St Eustatius [Statia] (2005) have all rejected 
independence and typically by huge margins (Bea, 2005; Cohn, 2003; McElroy & de Albuquerque, 
1996).8 Aruba cancelled its appointment with independence in 1995, although that had been the key 
condition for it having been granted status aparte 9 years earlier (Hoefte, 1996). In a 2002 referen-
dum in Gibraltar, albeit without “legal weight,” a resounding 98.97% voted to endorse their current 
status as a U.K. Overseas Territory (BBC, 2002). In July 1967, in a referendum on Anguilla’s seces-
sion from the fledgling state of St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, 1,813 voted for secession - and thus to 
revert to the status of a colony of the United Kingdom - and 5 against (Government of Anguilla, 
2006). In 2003, voters in both Martinique and Guadeloupe rejected proposals to streamline their 
administration. Note the choice of words:
The aim of the reform was to eliminate a tier of local government, but many voters appear 
to have feared it represented a step towards autonomy—in spite of assurances from Paris. 
(Caribbean Net News, 2003, italics added)
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In most other subnational jurisdictions, there has only been a minimal interest in considering 
sovereignty; and so, referenda on this matter have not even been proposed.9 Indeed, since 1984, 
the only small territories to struggle and obtain full independence—in other words, serving as 
classic examples of decolonization—were the following: (a) East Timor, in May 2002, with its 
independence referendum in September 1999 endorsed by 78.5% of voters (e.g., Chomsky, 
1999); (b) Montenegro, in June 2006, with an independence referendum narrowly endorsed by 
55.4% of voters (BBC, 2006); and (c) Kosovo, with a unilateral declaration of independence in 
February 2008 (CNN News, 2008).10 Deliberately excluded are the three former members of 
the Trust Territories of the Pacific: the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, 
and Palau. Although legally they are sovereign small island states (and members of the United 
Nations), they are not fully independent (e.g., Jonsson, 1997) but operate within a Compact of 
Free Association (COFA) with the United States, which accords the political status of free 
association to these island territories and grants the United States defense rights and obligations, 
while denying access to these island territories by other third party states (Friberg & Holen, 
2002). Indeed, these three “hybrid jurisdictions” (Levine & Roberts, 2005) represent attempts 
at exploiting the advantages of both sovereignty and an autonomy supported by a benign 
patron state.11
How can these manifestations of “upside down decolonization” be explained in a historical 
context? It appears, in retrospect, that small size and “islandness” may have something to do 
with this. The four decades of failed independence referenda described above have dealt mainly 
with small and island jurisdictions. They are the candidates that have remained unaffected by 
the grand wave of decolonization that has swept the world, creating more than a hundred new 
sovereign states in its wake.12 Indeed, a close look at the sequence of decolonization these past 
seven decades suggests that territories with larger populations—and their elites—were much 
more eager to struggle for, and achieve, independence. In fact, there is a clear correlation 
between population size and year of independence, certainly up to the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s. The larger the population base of a 
territory, the earlier has been its achievement of independence (Baldacchino, 2004). The smallest 
colonies took the longest to achieve independence (if at all), also because their colonial masters 
had serious doubts to their presumed viability and stability as independent states (Diggines, 
1985; Pirotta, Wettenhall, & Briguglio, 2001; Plischke, 1977). Independence was seen as “an 
extravagant and improvident recipe for the remaining small territories” (Wainhouse, 1964, 
p. 133); many of these remaining colonies were deemed “too small by any standards to become 
independent nations” (Chamberlain, 1985, p. 51). Indeed, the presumed nonviability of small 
countries was so ingrained that initial attempts at their decolonization were geared toward fed-
erative solutions.13
And yet, such a historical analysis would be stymied and hopelessly partial if it failed to 
appreciate an alternative view—that forthcoming “from below”—the policies, strategies, and 
“agency” of the political and economic elites and non-elites, of small, and in our case, mainly 
island, jurisdictions. The very smallest colonies have simply refused to toe the independence 
line. Note this illustrative altercation:
When Suriname was on its way to declare independence in 1975, the Surinamese Premier 
Henck Arron contacted Juan Evertsz, Premier of the Netherlands Antilles, asking him why 
the Antilles would not join Suriname and become independent: The reply: “If you will 
allow yourself to be hanged, it does not mean I will do the same.” (quoted in Hoefte & 
Oostindie, 1991, p. 75)
Although each case no doubt deserves to be examined on its own merits, there is a pattern in 
the rationale for refusing independence. Some of the key justifications are pragmatic to the 
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extreme: As Sir John Swan, a former Premier of Bermuda (the world’s oldest colony?), famously 
put it in 1982,
With the Americans to feed us and the British to defend us, who needs independence? 
(quoted in Sanders, 2005).
Most of the current empirical economic literature agrees that subnational dependencies tend 
to enjoy higher living standards than independent states (Armstrong & Read, 2000; Betermier, 
2004). Using 1998 GNP data for 108 territories (of which 75 are archipelagoes, islands, or on 
islands), Armstrong and Read (2003) infer the negative impact of sovereignty on per capita 
income. Using a Pacific data set and ordinary least squares regression, Bertram and Karagedikli 
(2004) report subnational jurisdictions enjoying per capita incomes 10 times greater than newly 
independent small states and with no evidence of regional convergence. Bertram (2004, p. 353) 
also concludes that in the Pacific, “independence did not pay as well as continued political 
dependence.” Similar conclusions are presented from a Pacific and Caribbean data set 
(McElroy & Sanborn, 2005).
How is this possible? Poirine (1999) analyzes how metropolitan powers maintain aid flows in 
exchange for “strategic services,” a relationship that is harder to break in nonsovereign territories. 
Both Connell (1994) and McElroy and Mahoney (2000) explain how political affiliation contin-
ues to grant substantial economic advantages to small, nonsovereign, typically island territories. 
These benefits include the following: free or concessionary trade with, and export preference 
from, the parent country; social welfare assistance; ready access to external capital through 
special tax concessions; availability of external labor markets through migration; aid-financed 
infrastructure and communications; higher quality health and educational systems; natural 
disaster relief; and provision of costly external defense. Autonomy without sovereignty also does 
not hinder the development of flourishing tourism economies and may actually facilitate them 
because of easier terms of access and security. Most of these special conditions have emerged in 
the context of a history of a relatively benign colonial relationship. Is subnational jurisdictional 
status one viable, inventive response to this facet of globalization—a part of a jurisdiction’s keen 
instinct for survival (Krasner, 2001)?
Benign Colonial Relations?
Yet how have these benefits been secured by some territories and not by others? Why have some 
territories struggled to obtain independence against the desires and plans of their colonial rulers 
while others have undergone, or experienced, exactly the opposite?14 And why has the latter turn 
of events been most strikingly visible among the world’s smallest and enisled jurisdictions?
The answers to these key but difficult questions possibly lie in the manner in which colonial 
relations were differently introduced, developed, and contested in many small and island locations. 
First, although small islands have taken the longest to consider independence (Doumenge, 1985), 
they have also been—with the exception of the Pacific—among the earliest territories to be colo-
nized, so retaining colonial links for longest (Caldwell, Harrison, & Quiggin, 1980). Feyrer and 
Sacerdote (2006) go so far as to suggest that the longer an island territory spent as a colony, the 
higher its present-day living standards and the lower its infant mortality rate: each additional 
century of European colonization is associated with a 40% boost in income today and a reduction 
in infant mortality of 2.6 deaths per 1,000 births. Second, the islands in question may not have 
had an indigenous population at all—or, if they had one, it had gone extinct—and were thus 
appropriately “discovered” de novo by Western explorers.15 In other cases, the natives—having 
no hinterland to retreat to (Hintjens, 1991)—were utterly and quickly wiped out following 
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contact with the West. This terra nullius scenario conveniently avoided the need to subjugate or 
somehow come to terms with indigenous populations because they did not (or did no longer) 
exist. Instead, so many island societies and cultures have thus not been colonized but created ex 
nihilo by colonial penetration from the outside (Houbert, 1986)—moving effectively from the 
register of the found to the register of the made (Sloterdijk, 2005). Third, the nature of the colo-
nial impact and experience was, on small islands, not just longer but also more total and intimate: 
again, the absence of a geographical but also a psychological hinterland meant that an intimate 
and regular engagement with the colonial presence and its psyche was inevitable for most local 
island populations. In some cases, it was the only access to formal employment (as in public 
administration) and formal education. Fourth, many small islands had hardly anything valuable 
worth exploiting in economic terms: unlike “plantation islands,” they were prized, strategic 
“fortress islands” (Warrington & Milne, 2007) defending sea routes or sheltered and deep-water 
harbors. In such a situation, the colonial power just had to ensure the loyalty of the local population: 
In other words, the sympathy of the locals at large (and not just that of the narrow elite) had to be 
guaranteed at all costs to maintain the security of the military base. Blatant economic exploitation 
had thus to be avoided and made way for deliberate strategies of assimilation, through techniques 
such as opportunities for social advancement through careerist civil service jobs, workfare, 
and overall benign paternalism.
This interrelated battery of conditions has nurtured colonized nations (and not just the members 
of their upper classes) with Western tastes, Western ideals, Western languages, and Western reli-
gions: “manufactured societies . . . creations of empire” (Naipaul, 1972, p. 254). These are clear 
manifestations of cultural incorporation, even if, at times, fleshed out in non-Western ethnicities 
(pun intended), even if unrequited by the Colonial motherland.16 Even independent island 
microstates have long been identified as “more Westernized” (Caldwell et al., 1980, p. 960). 
Microinsular domestic politics have been enthusiastically deployed at forestalling or postponing 
independence rather than clamoring for it: Greek Cypriots sought Ένωσις (unification) with 
Greece, whereas both Malta and Mauritius went as far as lobbying for integration with Britain, a 
policy platform that can be described as the very antithesis of decolonization (Baldacchino, 
2006; see Note 3). In so many cases, small island dependencies cling proudly and tenaciously to 
their colonial status (Guillebaud, 1976; Miles, 1985; Winchester, 1985/2003).
And so, “A few colonies did remain, unwilling to let go, or unwilling to stand alone” (Winchester, 
1985/2003, p. 339). Couching the situation as an outcome of some form of “unwillingness,” 
however, misses the point: the active pursuit of strategic self-interest by the islanders. It does not 
acknowledge the very useful “umbilical cord” that connects these island territories with usually 
benevolent (and at worst indifferent) larger powers and allows the junior partners in the coalition 
to offload some of their more pressing concerns. In particular, the connection grants asymmetri-
cal citizenship and mobility rights as well as a legitimate claim to state aid and concessionary 
finance: How else would so many Montserratians have been evacuated to Britain following the 
mid-1990 eruption of the Soufriere Volcano (e.g., BBC, 2007)? How else would Réunion have 
financed its new 70-km railway, to be completed by 2014, operated by a fleet of 100 km/h tram-
trains (International Railway Journal, 2004)? In contrast, sovereign states in the Pacific—such as 
the Solomons and Nauru—have risked “state failure” because of acute fiscal and social crises, 
respectively (Bryant-Tokalau & Frazer, 2006, passim; Connell, 2006). Sovereign states in the 
Caribbean complain that those who expound on the benefits of free trade exclude the free shut-
tling of labor from periphery to core from their equation (e.g., Girvan, 2004). Much of whatever 
prosperity exists in many remote islands and island territories has come about through overseas 
aid primarily from the colonial power and through international migration (almost always to the 
colonial power) and consequent remittances, and this migration was often possible because 
islanders retained the citizenship of that country (Connell, 2007).
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This is not to dismiss the relevance or significance of local agitation for independence; at 
some point, even many of these island jurisdictions would have had at least one political party 
advocating full independence—and that particular party (as in Bermuda, the Faroe Islands, and 
notably recently in Scotland and French Polynesia) may have also been elected to power and 
taken over the governance of the jurisdiction by itself or as a member of a ruling coalition.
Nor is this to diminish the lingering interest by the colonial/mainland state in extending its 
stewardship over island territories. Reasons for this include geostrategic interests,17 economic 
gain,18 or the practice of politically correct imperialism: bestowing largesse or rewarding sym-
pathetic governments with investment.19 But there is more: the format that such governance 
over subnational jurisdictions takes on suggests elements of suzerainty, of tributary statehood, 
of a neotrusteeship, and of a hierarchy of states generally, and all the more so when what is hap-
pening on islands is compared with what has been happening in, and to, such mainland flashpoint 
milieux as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Gaza, Iraq (and Baghdad’s Green Zone), Kosovo, Sierra Leone, 
and Somalia (e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2004). In studying export processing zones as responses to 
the South-East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, Ong (2004) identifies a wider resort by 
governments toward condoning—even creating—a progressively more variegated zonal capi-
talism or “graduated sovereignty”: a “complex and uneven experience of selective boundary 
crossings, subjectivities and exclusions” (Sidaway, 2007a, p. 352). This device acts to facilitate 
economic mobility and competitiveness while preserving, or even enhancing, the control of the 
local state. No contradiction here: it is precisely the “unbundling of territoriality” that enables 
such an increasingly borderless economy to coexist with a political system based on borders 
and sovereignty (Hudson, 2000, p. 276; Palan, 1998). The power of states is expressed precisely 
by a state’s ability to craft and condone excised spaces and legal limbos (Agamben, 2005). Such 
“enclave space” could very well be the new metageography of development (Sidaway, 2007b).
Revisiting Postcolonialism
Such initiatives are instructive episodes in understanding the epistemologies of contemporary 
postcolonialism. The impact of the first global financial crisis of the 21st century has revealed 
a form of fiscal vulnerability to which Iceland (a sovereign island state) has fallen victim and 
which has now reopened discussions in that nation about accession to the European Union 
(e.g., Spiegel On-Line, 2008; BBC, 2009). Autarchy has never been a realistic option for 
islands,20 in spite of a common but fundamentally erroneous opinion that islands are, by geo-
graphical disposition, insular, closed, and complete spaces.
If anything, islanders have long been recognized as an internationally mobile citizenry (e.g., 
Wood, 1967). The ingrained openness of small islands serves to orient their island inhabitants 
toward the metropole for inspiration, vacation, adventure, shopping, education, and/or employ-
ment. Small island literature is dominated by the migration theme (e.g., Brinklow, Ledwell, & 
Ledwell, 2000; Markham, 1989). Often, emigration is the only medium that permits a viable 
“exit” option to the pervasive and stifling totality, monopoly, and intimacy of the local sociocul-
tural environment (Baldacchino, 1997). Islanders from developing nations are known to have a 
very high propensity to migrate to developed countries (King & Connell, 1999). The highest 
proportion of non-OECD graduates living in an OECD country in 2005 were from Guyana, 
Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji, Angola, Cyprus and Mauritius—all but two of which 
are small island states (“Graduate emigration,” 2005). High levels of urbanization at home act 
to dislodge residents from outlying villages or islands (in the case of archipelagoes) and render 
them potentially more mobile regionally and internationally (Bertram & Watters, 1986). For 
various island households, migration becomes a strategic resource because offspring sent 
away can be expected to infuse remittances, in cash or in kind, to the home economy, acting as 
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a “transnational corporation of kin” (James, 1991; Marcus, 1981). In some instances (e.g., Cape 
Verde, Philippines, Samoa, and Tonga), these are significant contributions to the home island’s 
gross national income (e.g., Ahlburg & Brown, 1998). At any point in time, a significant per-
centage of an island population is likely to be away at its respective metropole(s) (Baldacchino, 
1997; Lowenthal, 1987) or even “in transit.” There may be no census more difficult to administer 
than that for a small island population!
Meanwhile, the world is becoming a platform for the scripting of an increasing number of 
offshore jurisdictional enclaves—a process that could work equally well for larger players who 
are otherwise unable to execute certain practices on their “home” ground, given their tax codes, 
gambling regulations, justice system, or regional and international responsibilities. Whether for 
diverging reasons such as public health, homeland security, or low tax, small islands have been 
developed—by their erstwhile colonial administrators as much as by their citizens—as niches 
for differential regulations and “special status.” Thus, there seeps in a common, even renewed 
interest in persisting with colonialism: a strategic permanence. There are more than a 100 such 
subnational island jurisdictions, some of which are members of federal units but most of which are 
reengineered ex-/neo-colonial “offshore” spaces, often with the consent and the blessing of the 
weaker party (Baldacchino, in press). The “rehashing” reflects “mainland–island” relations gen-
erally, in that it may be imposed unilaterally from above or nurtured unilaterally from below but 
is often an outcome of an ongoing process of negotiation and accommodation (Baldacchino & 
Milne, 2008).
No doubt, the full consequences of colonialism deserve their voice, and their space, in all their 
embarrassing detail. Yet postcolonial research (e.g., Le Sueur, 2003) may find it easier to pick on, 
and grapple with, Algeria rather than Mayotte, India rather than Bermuda, and Indonesia rather 
than Aruba. The relationship between colonial and postcolonial is not a neatly dialectical one. 
The postcolonial need not imply the anticolonial, and not even the post colonial (Royle, 2007).21 
I would quote Edmond and Smith (2003, pp. 5, 6) who affirm that
island stories have tended to slip the net of post-colonial theorizing. . . . Within theories of 
colonial discourse . . . islands are regarded merely as metonyms of imperialism, rather than 
as specific locations generating their own potentially self-reflective colonial metaphors.
One could draw a similar observation and cautionary note with respect to other fashionable 
“posts.” In presenting themselves as redeeming epistemologies, both poststructuralism and 
postmodernism can, in practice, act to appropriate and control their subject matter, obviating 
the relevance and damaging the credibility of alternative explanations (e.g., Tiffin, 1988).
Especially for small islands, there is quite a compelling case to be made today for autonomy 
without sovereignty. After all,
In an uncertain world, a substantial degree of autonomy, where culture and identity are 
respected and protected, reasonable access to employment and services exists, and security is 
guaranteed, has weakened the strength of the claim to independence. (Connell, 2003, p. 141)
Conclusion
Having “created” offshore, sovereignty and self-determination are themselves constrained 
and (re-)enabled in turn. (Palan, 1998, p. 625)
Islands have been the sites of some of the most brutal colonial encounters; others have been 
construed as offloading sites for the metropolitan societies’ worst citizens and high-risk patients. 
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And yet, pushing any of the current island “colonies” toward independence could be even 
construed as a “repulsive colonial act” (Hoefte & Oostindie, 1989, p. 29). Although local 
politicians may continue to peddle the rhetoric of independence as a long-term goal, progress 
in that direction appears nevertheless gripped by “an infinite pause” (Connell, 1994, p. 104, 
2003) and “sustained autonomy” (Quentin-Baxter, 1994).
In spite of the unambiguous words of former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, colonialism 
may not be “an anachronism in the 21st century”; it is not necessarily “an unachieved chapter of 
history.”22 An enduring, even if pragmatic, culture of colonial loyalty plus metropolitan initiatives 
in political excision, deserve and would benefit from further theorization into postcolonialism. 
Meanwhile, the lingering colonial administrators may have an exit strategy; it remains important 
to show that they do so in order to silence the inevitable critics or to appease their own citizenry 
into what may ultimately prove to be just fictional authority. Yet in all fairness, the metropolitan 
players may have every intention of permanently thwarting and postponing the implementation 
of any such departure plan from their subnational units while the locals of these same jurisdic-
tions, appeased by autonomy over policies which matter, may want to make absolutely sure that 
they do exactly that. Is theirs an enduring, lingering, postmodern neoimperialist alliance? In any 
case, such unorthodox behavior continues to fly in the face of rationalist theories of international 
relations (e.g., Amin & Palan, 2001; Cooley, 2005). It looks like island enclaves, as physical-
cum-legal domains, will be with us for some time yet.
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Notes
 1. Minutes of the meeting can be found at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gacol3198.doc.htm.
 2. For the complete list, visit http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/trust3.htm.
 3. Quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, May 31, 2004; Connell (2008, p. 164).
 4. For an extended review, see Connell (2008).
 5. For the text of the UN Resolution, visit http://www.gibnet.com/texts/un1514.htm.
 6. Comprising, until recently, the Caribbean island territories of Bonaire, Curaçao, Sint Maartin, Saba, 
and St Eustatius (also included Aruba until 1986). The Netherlands Antilles is now being disbanded.
 7. This policy stance would also have included returning colonies to appropriate “motherlands”—such 
as the Falklands to Argentina (Franks, Lord, & Collaborators, 1983, pp. 5-6, 27) and Hong Kong and 
Macau to China.
 8. Other than the two Tokelau referenda referred to above, the August 1998 vote held in Nevis (Premdas, 
2001) was the proverbial exception that justifies the rule: All three were approved by more than 60% of 
voters but fell short of a required two-thirds majority for the referenda to succeed.
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 9. The key exceptions here would be the following: (a) the Canadian province of Québec, with its 1980 
and 1995 referenda—the first securing 40.4% and the second securing 49.2% of votes for independence; 
(b) the deferred independence referendum on Bougainville, an outcome of the 2002 peace accord with 
Papua New Guinea (Ghai & Regan, 2006); and (c) the independence referendum expected after 2014 in 
New Caledonia. Meanwhile, the Scottish National Party–led Government in Scotland is committed to a 
referendum on Scottish independence.
10. These two cases are actually exceptions that justify the rule because they were both escaping from 
extensive repression, violence, and insecurity.
11. The Compact of Free Association (COFA) between the United States and the Federated States of 
Micronesia, and between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, were signed in 
1982, endorsed via referenda in 1983, and ratified in 1986 (COFA, 1985). The COFA with the Federated 
States of Micronesia was amended in May 2003. The Republic of Palau negotiated a separate Compact 
with the United States, effective from 1995, after no less than eight referenda.
12. Before World War II, there were 62 independent states; there are 194 at the time of writing (August 2008) 
and excluding Taiwan.
13. Including the West Indies Federation and Malaya–Singapore, both in the late 1950s to early 1960s.
14. Indeed, in the case of Ireland/Northern Ireland or the Comoros/Mayotte, the contrasting responses 
to decolonization occurred in the same territory. The same had occurred earlier, but on a much 
larger scale, in British North America, with Canada emerging as the loyalist option to the rebellious 
13 colonies.
15. These “empty islands” included Réunion, Seychelles, Pitcairn, St. Helena, Ascension, Tristan da 
Cunha, Bermuda, Cayman, and Falklands.
16. Thus, the “right of abode” in the United Kingdom was extended in 2002 to the citizens of all the 
(mainly non-White) residents of its remaining overseas territories. The 1982 Falklands invasion by 
Argentina was reportedly “a godsend” because “it acted as a catalyst for renewed British commitment 
in the South Atlantic” (Dodds, 2002, p. 202). The Chagossians continue to be thwarted of their right 
of domicile and the Ascension islanders of the right of abode.
17. Consider the military interests of the United States in Diego Garcia, Guam, Marshall Islands, Hawaii, 
and Okinawa and the former interest of metropolitan France in the South Pacific for nuclear testing 
purposes.
18. Exclusive Economic Zones can be many times larger than the land area of island territories and often 
contain large deposits of untapped resources.
19. The International Whaling Commission has become an obvious platform for such benevolence, as has 
the cold war relating to the securing of diplomatic relations with either the People’s Republic of China 
or Taiwan.
20. The glaring contemporary exception is Cuba, yet this is a situation imposed by the trade embargo of 
the United States, and it remains in place because the island is relatively large and its equally large 
population has been necessarily resourceful.
21. Bongie (1998, p. 13) goes further: Inspired by Lyotard, he prefers the variant “post/colonial” because 
it better describes an “entangled condition” where neither colonialism nor postcolonialism can be 
defined as clear-cut entities.
22. From his remarks at the opening of the session of the UN Decolonization Committee on February 14, 2004.
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